Without a doubt, one of the biggest challenges to the success or failure of what’s come to be known as Net 2.0 is the need to solve the problem of digital identity on an Internet-wide basis. The absence of a standardized (and generalized) Internet identity mechanism is keeping the digital community in a chaotic state.
In its simplest form, digital identity is the user name, and the password provides authentication. The purpose of digital Identity in the Net 2.0 universe is, according to Phil Becker, Editor-in-Chief of Digital ID World, “to restore the ease and security human transactions once had, when we all knew each other and did business face-to-face, to a machine environment where we are often meeting each other for the first time as we enter into transactions over vast distances.”
The Digital Wild West
Currently, digital identities are limited to specific domains, such as corporate enterprises, or specific sites. The absence of standards, according to Phil, is driving content suppliers to create private “silos and walled gardens” where entry is controlled with localized identity mechanisms, and little or no content is exchanged between domains. Phil argues that the large Internet content sites already find themselves in this position, and in the absence of a better alternative, have no incentive to organize by any other method. He asserts that the point where “silos” will crumble and “walled gardens” will break apart cannot happen without first solving the networked identity problem. Until then, we will only see either one walled garden replaced with a different one, or a form of virtual entropy that destroys the new Internet constructs.
But...would it be virtual entropy, or would it be similar to the historical example of the emergence of realizable engineering standards in Victorian times?
So, how come the engineering world “gets it?”
It’s easy to assume that the engineering world of standardized part numbers and components had the foresight to prevent the “silos and walled gardens” of today’s digital world. It actually took a long time to get to where everyone could reliably identify “the right part for the right machine.” In the early days, too many people had a vested interest in preventing interoperability between machine components (nuts, bolts, fixings, bearings, threads, etc). It was, in fact, not in the interest of some manufacturers—those who wanted to trap and retain customers so that they would return for further business.
In 1841, Joseph Whitworth, a British engineer, presented a paper before the Institute of Civil Engineers where he introduced his revolutionary thread system for screws. Up to this time, no conventions existed for screw threads. Although a Whitworth thread is stronger than its SAE counterpart, Whitworth’s American contemporary, William Sellers, didn’t like the shape of the thread on the Whitworth screw because it took “three kinds of cutters and two kinds of lathe” to make one.
Sellers proposed that the thread pyramid should have an angle of 60 degrees and that the top of the pyramid be flattened, which is much easier to make than the fancy rounded top of a Whitworth screw. Sellers claimed that his thread would need just one cutter and one lathe, and was therefore easier, quicker, and most importantly, cheaper to make. By 1883, the American railroads, which were the largest corporations in the USA, almost universally adopted the Sellers screw thread. This forced all of the railroad’s suppliers to use the Sellers screw thread.
Whitworth and Sellers: the Second World War
The final chapter in this saga took place during World War II. In the northern winter of 1941 – 1942, German tanks in the Panzer Division battled those of the British 8th Army in Africa. On both sides, the tanks broke down as bolts and screws wore out and loosened. American factories sent tons of bolts and screws to the battlefront—but they did not fit the British tanks. So for the rest of the war, the American factories ran two separate lines—one for British screw threads and one for American. Everyone agreed that having screws that didn’t match would be a very stupid reason to lose a war, so in 1948, the British agreed to use the Sellers thread, which by then was already called “US Standard”.
Also during the war, Packard, an American company, made British-designed Rolls Royce Merlin engines for US aircraft. Astonishingly, Packard replicated these engines right down to their Whitworth screws. But those same Merlin engines used two types of US-designed Bendix injection carburetors, both of which used US Standard threads. And British-built Merlins employed SU carburetors using Whitworth threads! The job facing Packard when it undertook manufacture of the Merlin was daunting, to say the least. Since no toolmaker in the US made Whitworth taps or dies, Packard was forced to make its own.
So, what drove adoption of standards?
The tipping point which drove the adoption of manufacturing standards came when component logistics because overwhelming. If manufacturers didn’t standardize on parts, their businesses would fail. According to Phil:
“…the ‘engineer’s mind” (versus the ‘marketer’s mind’) naturally seeks the ‘perfect solution’. That’s the blessing of the engineer’s mind. It is, of course, also the curse. As any student of technology history knows, the ‘perfect solution’ has rarely won the battle of the marketplace. Instead, the solution that solved the problem set using ‘the principle of good enough’ and also attained a critical mass of adoption has won.”
Thus, the superior design of the Whitworth screw lost to the faster-cheaper-easier design of the Seller screw.”
The key question is then, “When will the digital object world hit this point…or has it already in some sectors?
I'll address this important question in my next posting. Stay tuned!
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Guest blogger Robin Wilson, founder of RWCS Ltd., is a leading information architecture expert with extensive business development experience across a wide portfolio of client, contracting, and consulting organizations in both the UK and internationally. An acknowledged expert on Digital Identifier Policies, he is closely linked with leading-edge views on design information decision practice. RWCS Ltd. provides high-level support and resources for the development of Digital Information Architectures.
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